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Abstract
Performance monitoring, anomaly detection, and root-cause analysis in com-
plex cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are often highly intractable due to widely
diverse operational modes, disparate data types, and complex fault propaga-
tion mechanisms. This paper presents a new data-driven framework for root-
cause analysis, based on a spatiotemporal graphical modeling approach built
on the concept of symbolic dynamics for discovering and representing causal
interactions among sub-systems of complex CPSs. We formulate the root-
cause analysis problem as a minimization problem via the proposed inference
based metric and present two approximate approaches for root-cause analy-
sis, namely the sequential state switching (S3, based on free energy concept
of a restricted Boltzmann machine, RBM) and artificial anomaly association
(A3, a classification framework using deep neural networks, DNN). Synthetic
data from cases with failed pattern(s) and anomalous node(s) are simulated
to validate the proposed approaches. Real dataset based on Tennessee East-
man process (TEP) is also used for comparison with other approaches. The
results show that: (1) S3 and A3 approaches can obtain high accuracy in
root-cause analysis under both pattern-based and node-based fault scenar-
ios, in addition to successfully handling multiple nominal operating modes,
(2) the proposed tool-chain is shown to be scalable while maintaining high
accuracy, and (3) the proposed framework is robust and adaptive in different
fault conditions and performs better in comparison with the state-of-the-art
methods.
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1. Introduction
With a large number of highly interactive sub-systems in cyber-physical
systems (CPSs), performance monitoring, anomaly detection, and root-cause
analysis is challenging in terms of widely diverse operational modes, disparate
data types, and diverse fault mechanisms [1, 2]. Data-driven approaches for
anomaly detection in CPSs are more and more focused, especially in the
situation that data (e.g., measurements, logs, events) are becoming increas-
ingly accessible and abundant (in terms of cost and availability) [1, 3–5].
To exploit the large data availability in distributed CPSs and implement ef-
fective monitoring and decision making, data-driven approaches are being
explored including (i) learning and inference in CPSs with multiple nominal
modes, (ii) identifying anomaly and root cause without labeled data, and (iii)
handling continuous and discrete data simultaneously [6, 7]. Moreover, the
data-driven methods for complex systems need to be robust, flexible, scalable
and adaptive [8, 9].
For the anomaly detection with multivariate time-series, intensive re-
search has been implemented with proposed approaches such as clustering
[10, 11], fuzzy c-means [12], sparse representation [13], Hidden Markov mod-
els [14], multivariate orthogonal space transformation [15], and independent
component analysis [16]. The temporal information is more analyzed in ex-
ploring the multivariate time-series, and the spatial relationship is recently
applied for anomaly detection [17, 18].
In order to support decision making in CPSs [19], root-cause analysis is
essential after an anomaly is detected. Here, root-cause analysis is intended
to find out the anomalous variable(s) or sub-system(s) among all of the mea-
sured variables or sub-systems that cause the anomaly of the system (or
the one or more time-series in the multivariate time-series that cause the
anomaly). Among the root-cause analysis approaches, classification methods
are widely used in fault localization [20], while graphical modeling approaches
(e.g., Bayesian network [21]) are becoming more and more applied in under-
standing of local structures to identify the root cause. One important aspect
is that complex interactions between sub-systems are fundamental character-
istics in distributed CPSs. These interactions can be used for modeling the
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system behavior and infer the root cause of an anomaly [2]. In this context,
causality, as a tool to determine the cause and the effect in systems (i.e.,
analyze the interactions between the sub-systems) [22], is naturally suited
for root-cause analysis in CPSs. Studies show that the causality from and
to the fault variable presents differences and hence can be used to reason
the root-cause from multivariate time series data [23–26]. [18] derived neigh-
borhood similarity and coefficient similarity from Granger-Lasso algorithm,
to compute anomaly score and ascertain threshold for anomaly detection
and infer the faulty variable. A causality analysis index based on dynamic
time warping is proposed by Li et. al. [27] to determine the causal direction
between pairs of faulty variables in order to overcome the shortcoming of
Granger causality in nonstationary time series. Fault-related variables can
be clustered and root-cause analysis is implemented in each cluster. A dy-
namic uncertain causality graph is proposed for probabilistic reasoning and
applied to fault diagnosis of generator system of nuclear power plant [28].
The proposed approaches provide efficient tools in discovering causality in
complex systems, while an approach for interpreting the variation of causal-
ity into decisions on failed patterns of fault variable/node/time-series is less
investigated. Here, a pattern represents the individual behavior of or the
causal dependency between the variables/nodes in the system and a failed
pattern means that the behavior/dependency is significantly changed under
an anomalous condition.
Data-driven approaches that can detect anomaly and infer root cause
without using labeled training data (i.e., with data pre-classified as being
anomalous, or as each pre-classified anomalous condition) are critical for ap-
plications in distributed complex CPSs [29–32], as collecting labeled data in
these systems is time-consuming and some of the anomalies cannot be exper-
imentally injected or easily collected from field operation. During the last
decade, unsupervised approaches have received a large amount of attention,
where the assumption regarding the ratio of the amount of anomalous data to
nominal data is different for different problems and requires significant prior
knowledge about the underlying system [33]. To implement unsupervised
anomaly detection for distributed complex systems, an energy-based spa-
tiotemporal graphical modeling framework [34], where a spatiotemporal fea-
ture extraction scheme is built on Symbolic Dynamic Filtering (SDF) [35, 36]
for discovering and representing causal interactions among the sub-systems
(defined as spatiotemporal pattern network, STPN) and the characteristics of
the features in nominal condition are captured by restricted Boltzmann ma-
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chine (RBM) [37]. With this framework (noted as STPN+RBM), the main
intent is to capture various system-level nominal patterns such that anomaly
detection can be carried out without using labeled data (specifically without
the need of data examples for pre-classified anomalies).
Based on the formulation presented in [38], this work provides the proof
of the concept with detailed description of the problem and presents a semi-
supervised tool for root-cause analysis in complex systems with pattern-based
root-cause analysis algorithm and a novel node-based inference algorithm to
isolate the possible failed node (variable or subsystem) in the distributed
complex systems. Two approaches for root-cause analysis, namely the se-
quential state switching (S3, based on free energy concept of an RBM) and
artificial anomaly association (A3, a supervised framework using deep neural
networks, DNN) are presented in [38]. As S3 and A3 are built on the interac-
tions (patterns in STPN) between sub-systems of CPSs, they are naturally
pattern-based, thus we present a node-inference method in this work to inter-
pret the faulty node (variable or sub-system in CPSs). Synthetic data from
cases with failed pattern(s) and faulty node are simulated to validate the
proposed approaches. Real data based on Tennessee Eastman process (TEP)
is used for testing the proposed approach. The results are compared with
the state-of-the-art methods in terms of root-cause analysis performance.
The contributions of this work include: (i) framing the root-cause analysis
problem as a minimization problem using the inference based metric as well as
the proof of the concept, (ii) two new approximate algorithms–S3 and A3–for
the root-cause analysis problem with node inference algorithm to isolate the
possible failed node (variable or subsystem), (iii) validation of the proposed
algorithms in terms of accuracy, scalability, robustness, adaptiveness and
efficiency using synthetic data sets and real data sets under a large number
of different fault scenarios, and (iv) performance comparison with the state-
of-the-art methods.
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows. Section
2 provides brief background and preliminaries including definition of STPN,
basics of RBM, and STPN+RBM framework for anomaly detection; Sec-
tion 3 presents the problem formulation of the root-cause analysis algorithm,
the proposed approaches–S3 and A3–for root-cause analysis, and the node-
inference approach to identify the faulty node; Section 4 describes results
for validation and comparisons of the proposed approaches with the state-
of-the-art methods using synthetic and real datasets. Finally, the paper is
summarized and concluded with directions for future work in Section 5.
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2. Background and preliminaries
Graphical modeling is increasingly being applied in complex CPSs for
learning and inference [39]. Among different types of graphs, directed acyclic
graph (DAG) is typical and widely discussed, as the acyclicity assumption
simplifies the theoretical analysis and is reasonable in usual cases [40]. How-
ever, the assumption is also not satisfied in many other cases, when causal
cycles exist. An example is that causal cycles occur frequently in biological
systems such as gene regulatory networks and protein interaction networks
[41]. Without the acyclicity assumption, causality with cycles (named as
directed cyclic graph and directed pseudograph) is more difficult to be fully
discovered [42]. But the interpretation of cycles and loops may significantly
improve the quality of the inferred causal structure [41]. Several algorithms
are proposed to discover causality in cyclic cases [42–44], but fully discover-
ing the graphical models with cycles is still challenging and the discovered
graph may be inaccurate.
In this case, our previous work presented STPN+RBM framework for dis-
covering the graphs that can be reasonably applied in modeling CPSs, where
STPN is treated as a weaker learner to extract features (e.g., interactions and
causality) between sub-systems, and RBM is used as a boosting approach to
capture multiple operation modes in CPSs.
2.1. STPN
Data abstraction (partitioning/discretization) is the first step in STPN
modeling, followed by learning Markov machines (defined by D-Markov ma-
chine and xD-Markov machine in SDF). While details can be found in [45, 46],
a brief description is provided as follows for completeness.
Let X = {XA(t), t ∈ N, A = 1, 2, · · · , f} be a multivariate time series,
where f is the number of variables or dimension of the time series. Let X
denote a set of partitioning/discretization functions [36], X : X(t) → S,
that transforms a general dynamic system (time series X(t)) into a symbol
sequence S with an alphabet set Σ. Various partitioning approaches have
been proposed in the literature, such as uniform partitioning (UP), maximum
entropy partitioning (MEP, used for the present study), maximally bijec-
tive discretization (MBD), and statistically similar discretization (SSD) [47].
Subsequently, a probabilistic finite state automaton (PFSA) is employed to
describe states (representing various parts of the data space) and probabilis-
tic transitions among them (can be learned from data) via D-Markov and
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xD-Markov machines.
An STPN is defined as:
Definition. A PFSA based STPN is a 4-tuple WD ≡ (Q
a,Σb,Πab,Λab):
(a, b denote nodes of the STPN)
1. Qa = {q1, q2, · · · , q|Qa|} is the state set corresponding to symbol sequences
Sa.
2. Σb = {σ0, · · · , σ|Σb|−1} is the alphabet set of symbol sequence S
b.
3. Πab is the symbol generation matrix of size |Qa|× |Σb|, the ijth element of
Πab denotes the probability of finding the symbol σj in the symbol string
sb while making a transition from the state qi in the symbol sequence S
a;
while self-symbol generation matrices are called atomic patterns (APs)
i.e., when a = b, cross-symbol generation matrices are called relational
patterns (RPs) i.e., when a 6= b.
4. Λab denotes a metric that can represent the importance of the learned
pattern (or degree of causality) for a→ b which is a function of Πab.
2.2. RBM
As an energy-based method, weights and biases of RBM are learned to
obtain low energy (or high probability) of the features observed from training
data, which is the basis of an energy-based model [37]. If the training data is
(mostly) nominal in operating conditions, the learned RBM should capture
the nominal behavior of the system.
Consider a system state that is described by a set of visible variables v =
(v1, v2, · · · , vD) and a set of hidden (latent) variables h = (h1, h2, · · · , hF ).
With this configuration, the probability of a state P (v,h) is only determined
by the energy of the configuration (v, h) and follows the Boltzmann distri-
bution,
P (v,h) =
e−E(v,h)∑
v,h e
−E(v,h)
(1)
Typically, during training, weights and biases are obtained via maximizing
likelihood of the training data.
Considering the weak learner with STPN in the interpretation of causality
within distributed complex systems, RBM is applied as a boosting approach
to form a strong learner based on multiple STPNs. Also, RBM is used for
capturing multiple operating modes in complex CPSs.
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2.3. STPN+RBM framework
The steps of learning the STPN+RBM model are [48]:
1. Learning APs and RPs (atomic patterns, individual node behaviors; and
relational patterns, pair-wise interaction behaviors) from the multivariate
training symbol sequences.
2. Considering short symbol sub-sequences from the training sequences and
evaluating Λab ∀a, b for each short sub-sequence, noted as the inference
based metric Λab for the pattern a→ b.
3. For one sub-sequence, based on a user-defined threshold on Λij, assign-
ing state 0 or 1 for each AP and RP; thus every sub-sequence leads
to a binary vector of length L, where L = number of APs (#AP ) +
number of RPs (#RP ).
4. An RBM is used for capturing system-wide behavior with nodes in the
visible layer corresponding to learnt APs and RPs.
5. The RBM is trained with binary vectors generated from nominal training
sub-sequences.
6. Anomaly detection is carried out by estimating the probability of occur-
rence of a test STPN pattern vector via trained RBM.
Root-cause analysis is based on this framework in two aspects: (i) the
inference based metric is used for formulating root-cause analysis algorithm,
and (ii) anomaly detection status of the complex CPS with STPN+RBM is
the trigger to implement the root-cause analysis.
3. Methodology
3.1. Root-cause analysis problem formulation
With the definition of STPN in Section 2.1 and STPN+RBM framework
in Section 2.3, the inference based metric is employed for evaluating the
patterns (APs & RPs). The inference based metric computation includes
a modeling phase and a inference phase [46]. In the modeling phase, the
time-series in the nominal condition is applied, noted as X = {XA(t), t ∈ N,
A = 1, 2, · · · , f}, where f is the number of variables or the dimension of the
time series. The time series is then symbolized into S = {SA} using MEP
7
followed by the generation of state sequence using the STPN formulation
where Q = {Qa, a = 1, 2, · · · , f}. In the learning phase, short time-series
is considered, X˜ = {X˜A(t) for the short time-series in nominal condition,
t ∈ N∗, A = 1, 2, · · · , f}, where N∗ is a subset of N, and Xˆ = {XˆA(t)
for the short time-series in anomalous condition. The corresponding short
symbolic subsequences is noted as S˜ = {S˜A} and Sˆ = {SˆA} for nominal
condition and anomalous condition respectively, and the state sequences Q˜
and Qˆ correspondingly.
We define an importance metric Λab for a given short subsequence (de-
scribed by short state subsequence Q˜ and short symbol subsequence S˜). The
value of this metric suggests the importance of the pattern a→ b as evidenced
by the short subsequence. In this context, we consider
Λab(Q˜, S˜) ∝ Pr({Q˜a, S˜b}|{Qa, Sb}) (2)
where Pr({Q˜a, S˜b}|{Qa, Sb}) is the conditional probability of the joint state-
symbol subsequence given the sequence from the modeling phase.
With this definition of Λab and with proper normalization, the inference
based metric Λab(Q˜, S˜) can be expressed as follows according to [46],
Λab(Q˜, S˜) =
K
|Qa|∏
m=1
(N˜abm )!(N
ab
m + |Σ
b| − 1)!
(N˜abm +N
ab
m + |Σ
b| − 1)!
|Σb|∏
n=1
(N˜abmn +N
ab
mn)!
(N˜abmn)!(N
ab
mn)!
(3)
where, K is a proportional constant, Nabmn , |{(Q
a(k), Sb(k+1) : Sb(k+1) =
σbn | Q
a(k) = qam}| is to get the number of the state-symbol pairs in the
set {(Qa(k), Sb(k + 1)} where Sb(k + 1) = σbn given Q
a(k) = qam, N
ab
m =∑|Σb|
n=1(N
ab
mn), N˜
ab
mn and N˜
ab
m are similar to N
ab
mn and N
ab
m , |Q
a| is number of
states in state sequence Q˜, and |Σb| is number of symbols in symbol sequence
S˜.
A detailed derivation can be found in [46].
For an anomalous condition, the inference based metric Λab(Qˆ, Sˆ) for a
pattern a→ b is obtained as follows[46],
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Λab(Qˆ, Sˆ) =
K
|Qa|∏
m=1
(Nˆabm )!(N
ab
m + |Σ
b| − 1)!
(Nˆabm +N
ab
m + |Σ
b| − 1)!
|Σb|∏
n=1
(Nˆabmn +N
ab
mn)!
(Nˆabmn)!(N
ab
mn)!
(4)
where Nˆ is with the similar definition in Eq. 4, while it is emanated from
the time series Xˆ = {XˆA(t), t ∈ N∗, A = 1, 2, · · · , f} in the anomalous
condition.
For simplicity, we denote the metric in the nominal condition and the
anomalous condition as Λabnom and Λ
ab
ano respectively. Let δ
(
ln(Λab)
)
denote
the variation of the metric due to the presence of an anomaly,
δ
(
ln(Λab)
)
= ln
(
Λabnom
)
− ln
(
Λabano
)
. (5)
We also define the set of metric values for all patterns in the nominal
condition as Λnom = {Λ
ab
nom} ∀a, b and the set of metric values for all patterns
in the anomalous condition as Λano = {Λ
ab
ano} ∀a, b.
To explain the changes of metric Λ caused by the anomalous condition,
we assume a two-state case (i.e., the Q only contains two states q1 and q2),
the short state sequences between the nominal condition and anomalous con-
dition (with two subsystems a and b) are Q˜ = {qa1q
a
1 · · · q
a
2 ; q
b
1q
b
1 · · · q
b
2} and
Qˆ = {qa1q
a
2 · · · q
a
2 ; q
b
1q
b
1 · · · q
b
2} respectively.
An illustration of the changes in the anomaly is shown in Fig. 1. Note
that for simplicity, we assume the depth D = 1. Hence, the state q and
symbol σ are equivalent, and the state generation matrix defined in Section
2.1, can be used for state-to-state transition computation.
Assumption 1. In this illustrative example, suppose that the states change
from qa1 in the nominal condition to q
a
2 in the anomalous condition in subsys-
tem a for ηa times, and the changes only occur in the state transitions from
qa1 → q
b
1 for the xD-Markov machine.
From Assumption 1, the Hamming distance between Q˜ and Qˆ is ηa ∈ N.
Note, in a real case, this may be caused by the magnitude increase of a real
valued observation in the anomalous condition. However, the practical situ-
ation is typically more complicated, and the changes may occur in different
state transitions at multiple time periods simultaneously.
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Figure 1: A two-state case of anomalous condition with two sub-systems. The state
transitions between the subsystems a and b are first defined in the nominal condition
(shown in the top panel) assuming the depth D = 1 and the time lag p = 1. Then, in the
anomalous condition, changes occur from the state qa
1
to the state qa
2
in the subsystem a
and we assume that the changes only exist in the transitions qa
1
→ qb
1
(i.e., they change
to qa
2
→ qb
1
due to the anomaly). The Hamming distance between the sequence for the
subsystem a in the anomalous condition and that in the nominal condition is ηa.
Based on the assumption, we have,
Nˆabm = N˜
ab
m − sgn(qm)η
a (6)
sgn(qx) =
{
1 if qx = q1
−1 if qx = q2
(7)
where the states q1 and q2 are from the state set Q in the state sequence.
Note that N˜m depend on the partitioning process.
From Assumption 1, the changes only exist from qa1 → q
b
1 to q
a
2 → q
b
1
(i.e., qa1 → σ
b
1 to q
a
2 → σ
b
1 with D = 1). Therefore, Nˆ
ab
m1 is affected, where
N˜abm1 , |{(Qˆ
a(k), Sˆb(k + 1) : Sˆb(k + 1) = σb1 | Qˆ
a(k) = qam}|. Nˆ
ab
m2 doesn’t get
affected. Thus,
Nˆabm1 = N˜
ab
m1 − sgn(qm)η
a, Nˆabm2 = N˜
ab
m2. (8)
Assumption 2. In this analysis, for simplicity, we assume Nabm = kN˜
ab
m , m =
1, 2, where the short sub-sequence is a subset of the sequence from the mod-
eling phase, and with the same features. k ≫ 1, when the sequence in the
modeling phase (historical data in the nominal condition) is long enough.
10
Similarly, the consequence of Assumption 2 can get Nabmn = kN˜
ab
mn, m, n =
1, 2.
Assumption 3. With proper partitioning, N˜11 and N˜21 are within similar
orders.
Lemma 1. Let Assumption 3 hold and N˜ab1 = t1N˜
ab
11 such that (t1− 1)k > 1.
Proof sketch. We have Assumption 3 such that there exists a constant ζ > 0
to enable t − 1 > ζ, which combined with Assumption 2 yields the desired
result. See Section 7.1 in the supplementary material.
Similarly, let N˜ab2 = t2N˜
ab
21 . With this setup, we have the following propo-
sition,
Proposition 1. Let Assumptions 1-3 hold. The variation of the metrics in
the anomalous condition δ
(
ln(Λab)
)
> 0, when ηa ≥ 1.
Proof sketch. To show the conclusion, we first give the explicit expression
of δ
(
ln(Λab)
)
using Eq. 5 in terms of the summation of logarithmic Gamma
functions. According to the derivative property of the logarithmic Gamma
function, the derivative of δ
(
ln(Λab)
)
with respect to ηa can be represented
by a summation of the Harmonic series, which can also be approximated
by a logarithmic function plus a Euler-Mascheroni constant. Eventually, the
derivative of δ
(
ln(Λab)
)
with respect to ηa is expressed as a summation of sev-
eral logarithmic functions, which are evaluated positive by combining Lemma
1 and definitions aforementioned to get the conclusion. See Section 7.2 in the
supplementary material.
Therefore, the variation of the metrics δ
(
ln(Λab)
)
is relative to the changes
of states ηa in the anomalous condition. Based on this metric, the root-cause
analysis algorithm can be formulated.
The main idea behind the presented root-cause analysis algorithm is to
perturb the distribution of testing patterns in an artificial way to make
it close to the distribution of nominal patterns, to identify the possible
nodes/patterns which bring the test pattern distribution sufficiently close
to the distribution of nominal patterns. Then the identified nodes/patterns
can be determined as the root-cause(s) for the detected anomaly. More for-
mally, let us assume that an inference metric Λabano changes to Λ
ab′
ano due to
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an artificial perturbation in the pattern a → b. We now consider a subset
of patterns, for which we have the set of inference metrics {Λabano} ⊂ Λano.
Let a perturbation in this subset changes the overall set of metrics to Λ′ano.
Therefore, we have the following:
Λ′ano =
{
Λabano if Λ
ab
ano 6∈ {Λ
ab
ano}
Λab′ano if Λ
ab
ano ∈ {Λ
ab
ano}
(9)
The root cause analysis is then framed as a minimization problem between
the set of nominal inference metrics Λ and the set of perturbed inference
metrics Λ′ that can be expressed as follows:
{Λabano}
⋆ = min
{Λabano}
D
(
Λ′ano,Λnom
)
, (10)
where D is a distance metric (e.g., Kullback-Leibler Distance–KLD[49, 50])
to estimate the distance between Λnom and Λ
′
ano. The nodes (e.g., a or b) or
patterns (e.g., a→ b) involved in the optimal subset {Λabano}
⋆ will be identified
as possible root cause(s) for the detected anomaly. However, exact solution
for this optimization problem is not computationally tractable for large sys-
tems. Therefore, we propose two approximate algorithms: the sequential
state switching (S3) - a sequential suboptimal search method and artificial
anomaly association (A3) - a semi-supervised learning based method.
3.2. Sequential state switching (S3)
The basic idea of A3 is illustrated in [38], one-layer RBM is applied in this
work to capture the system-wide behavior of the CPS, where the number of
hidden units is chosen by maximizing the activation of the inputs from 16 to
256.
With the weights and biases of RBM, free energy can be computed. Free
energy is defined as the energy that a single visible layer pattern would need
to have in order to have the same probability as all of the configurations that
contain v [51], which has the following expression:
F (v) = −
∑
i
viai −
∑
j
ln(1 + ebj+
∑
i viwij ) (11)
The free energy in nominal conditions is noted as F˜ . In cases where there
are multiple input vectors with more than one nominal mode, free energy in
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the nominal states can be averaged or used in conjunction with other metrics.
In anomalous conditions, a failed pattern will shift the energy from a lower
state to a higher state. Assume that the patterns can be categorized into
two sets, vnom and vano. By flipping the set of anomalous patterns vano, a
new expression for free energy is obtained:
F s(v) =−
∑
g
vgag −
∑
j
ln(1 + ebj+
∑
g vgwgj)
−
∑
h
v⋆hah −
∑
j
ln(1 + ebj+
∑
h v
⋆
h
whj),
{vg} ∈ v
nom, {v⋆h} ∈ v
⋆,ano
(12)
Here, v⋆ has the opposite state to v and represents that the probability
of the pattern has been significantly changed. In this work, the probabilities
of the patterns are binary (i.e. 0 or 1). Hence, we have that v⋆ = 1− v. The
sequential state switching is formulated by finding a set of patterns vano via
min(F s(vano, vnom)− F˜ ).
The root-cause analysis procedure is triggered when an anomaly is de-
tected by STPN+RBM framework. With Algorithm 1, the threshold of free
energy of RBM F c is initialized as the one in the anomalous condition, the
candidate set of anomalous inputs vp are obtained with {v : F
s(v) < F c},
then at each step: (i) vano is updated by adding the input vi with maximum
free energy decrease during perturbations on the set vnom, where vano is the
set of inputs with anomalous patterns (initially empty set); (ii) the set of in-
puts with nominal patterns vnom is updated by removing the input vi which
is determined as anomalous at substep (i); (iii) the threshold of free energy
of RBM F c is updated by the inputs v⋆,ano ∪vnom, where v⋆,ano is the inputs
after perturbations; and (iv) the candidate set of inputs vp (i.e., the inputs
of RBM) is updated by removing the input vi.
An algorithmic description of this process (Algorithm 2) is presented as
follows.
It should be noted that free energy F is used in Algorithm 1 to be applied
as the distance metric of the Eq. 10, and it can be used along with other
metrics such as KLD. Using KLD alongside with free energy is particularly
useful when the distribution of free energy is obtained with multiple sub-
sequences. KLD may be more robust as it takes multiple sub-sequences into
account because a persistent anomaly across the subsequences will cause a
13
Algorithm 1 Root-cause analysis with sequential state switching (S3)
method
1: procedure STPN+RBM modeling ⊲ Algorithm 1 in [34]
2: Online process of computing likelihoods/probabilities of APs & RPs
3: Training RBM to achieve low energy state, using binary vectors from
nominal subsequences
4: end procedure
5: procedure Anomaly detection ⊲ Algorithm 2 in [34]
6: Online anomaly detection via the probability of the current state via
trained RBM
7: end procedure
8: procedure Root-cause analysis
9: if Anomaly = True then
10: F c0 ← F
s(v) ⊲ F c is the current free energy with input vector
v = vnom ∪ vano.
11: vp ← {v : F
s(v) < F c}
12: vano = ∅, vnom = v
13: while vp 6= ∅ ∨ {v : F
s(v⋆,ano,vnom) < F c} = ∅ do
14: vano ← vano ∪ {vi : F
s(v⋆,ano ∪ v⋆i ,v
nom) = F c}
15: vnom ← vnom \ vano
16: F c ← min(F s(v⋆,ano ∪ v⋆i ,v
nom)), vi ∈ vp, v
⋆
i = 1− vi, v
⋆,ano =
1− vano
17: vp ← vp \ {vi : F
s(v⋆,ano ∪ v⋆i ,v
nom) = F c}
18: end while
19: end if
20: A bijective function: f : Λ→ v
21: Λano = f−1(vano)
22: return Λano
23: end procedure
significant impact on KLD.
3.3. Artificial anomaly association (A3)
Artificial anomaly association is based on a method proposed in [52] to
solve a multi-label classification problem using convolutional neural networks
(CNNs). Instead of inferring a single class from the trained model, the frame-
work solves nout classification sub-problems if an output vector of length nout
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is required using the previously learned model. The implementation of this
formulation requires only a slight modification in the loss function: for an
output sequence with length nout, the loss function to be minimized for a
data set D is the negative log-likelihood defined as:
ℓtotal(θ = {W, b},D) =
−
np∑
j=1
|D|∑
i=0
[
log
(
P (Y = y(i)|x(i),W, b)
)]
j
(13)
where D denotes the training set, θ is the model parameters with W as
the weights and b for the biases. y is predicted target vector whereas x is
the provided input pattern. The total loss is computed by summing the
individual losses for each sub-label.
The input is prepared in an n2-element vector with values of either 0 or 1
which is learnt by the STPN model. We desire to map the input vector to an
output vector of the same length (termed as the indicator label), where the
value of each element within the output vector indicates whether a specific
pattern is anomalous or not. For nominal modes, the input vector may be
comprised of different combinations of 0’s and 1’s, and the indicator labels
will be a vector of all 1’s (where the value 1 denotes nominal). However, if a
particular element i within the input vector gets flipped, then the indicator
label corresponding to the i-th position in the output vector will be flipped
and switches from 1 (nominal) to 0 (anomalous). In this way, we can identify
that the i-th pattern is anomalous. With this setup, a classification sub-
problem (i.e. is this pattern norminal, or anomalous?) can be solved for each
element in the output vector given the input data. One might argue that
multi-label classification is unnecessary and adds to higher computational
overhead. Although a single class label denoting which pattern has failed may
work for a single anomalous pattern case, it is not sufficient for simultaneous
multiple pattern failures.
Neural network parameters: Training data is generated from 6 modes
including both nominal and artificial anomalous data. The number of avail-
able training data is dependent on the size of the system under study. The
training data is further split into an equally-sized training set and valida-
tion set. Testing was performed on datasets generated from entirely different
modes. The DNN comprises 1 to 3 layers of 1024 to 4096 hidden units each
and trained with dropout fractions of 0.4 to 0.8 using ReLU activations. A
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batch size ranging from 50 to 4096 is used. All hyperparameters as described
are chosen by cross-validation, and the set of optimal hyperparameters vary
depending on the training data used. The training procedure employs the
early-stopping algorithm where training stops when validation error ceases
to decrease.
3.4. Node inference via S3 and A3
The proposed approaches, S3 and A3, intend to implement root-causes
analysis by finding out the failed patterns (namely pattern-based root-cause
analysis). This kind of pattern failures occurs in cyber-physical systems,
where cyber-attacks may only compromise interactions among sub-systems
without directly affecting sub-systems. In the meantime, there are a lot of
cases where failures may emerge in sub-systems. In such cases, the failures
mostly break connections from and to the failed sub-system (treated as node
in the probabilistic graphical models). With patterns found by S3 or A3,
node inference (i.e., to find out the failed node in the graphical model and
the anomalous variable/sub-system in the CPS) is presented here to the
later case with faulty variable (sub-system) in CPSs (namely node-based
root-cause analysis).
Based on the anomalous patterns {Λano} obtained by S3 or A3, node
inference is to find a subset Xˆ of X = {XA(t), t ∈ N, A = 1, 2, · · · , n}
that can interpret all of the failed patterns Λano. For example, a pattern
Ni → Nj is identified as failed, and it indicates that the two nodes (Ni, Nj)
are potentially failed. If multiple patterns from or to a node are detected
as anomalous, the node is more reliable to be classified as anomalous. Thus,
the node inference can be carried out via computing the anomaly score of
each node. Also, as the failed patterns contribute differently to the system,
weights of failed patterns are defined. For S3, the weights (∆ = {δ}) of failed
patterns can be formed by the difference of free energy with and without the
failed pattern, also they can be computed by the KLD metric. For A3, the
weights can be obtained by counting the number of occurrence of the patterns
in multiple testing outputs, or evaluate the probability of the activation of
the outputs.
As the RBM inputs (v) are generated by the patterns of STPN (Λ, Λa,a
for AP and Λa,b for RP), each RBM inputs can be attributed to a pattern
in STPN. And each weight (σ) of the failed pattern (Λa,b) in STPN can be
connected to two nodes (variables or sub-systems) in the CPSs, i.e., σ(v)→
σ(Λ), σ(Λ)→ σ(Xa, Xb). With this setup, the anomaly score for each node
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XA is obtained by sum of the weights,
S(XA) =
∑
σ(XA, Xa) +
∑
σ(Xa, XA), Xa ∈ X. (14)
A sequential searching for node inference is applied by finding out the
node with maximum anomaly score each time. At each step: (i) the anoma-
lous patterns Λano are obtained by the bijection function f−1(vano), (ii) the
weights of the anomalous patterns Λano are obtained via the set of inputs
vano, (iii) the anomaly scores S (node based) are computed with the weights
of the anomalous patterns Λano, where each pattern is connected to a node
set (Xa, Xb) (head and tail nodes), (iv) the set of anomalous nodes X˜ is up-
dated via finding out the node XA with maximum anomaly score, and (v) the
anomalous patterns are updated by removing the ones that connected to the
anomalous node XA determined at substep (iv). An algorithmic description
of this process (Algorithm 2) is presented as follows.
Note that Algorithm 2 intends to find out the minimum subset of nodes
that can interpret all of the failed patterns obtained by Algorithm 1. Further
analysis is being carried out including introducing penalty factor to optimize
node searching that can possibly cause the patterns presented as failed and
identify the anomaly degree of a specific node.
4. Results and discussions
The pattern based root-cause analysis approaches proposed in Section
3 provide us the insight to identify the failed patterns in complex CPSs
(corresponding to the cases that cyber-attacks may only influence interactions
between specific sub-systems), and performance evaluation of S3 and A3
are carried out in Section 4.1 including three synthetic datasets to simulate
anomaly in pattern(s)/node(s), respectively. Using node inference algorithm
in Section 3.4, validation of the proposed approaches are illustrated in Section
4.2, with synthetic dataset and real data (TEP dataset [53]).
4.1. Pattern based root-cause analysis
4.1.1. Anomaly in pattern(s)
Anomaly in pattern(s) is defined as the change of one or more causal
relationships. Anomaly translates to a changed/switched pattern in the con-
text of STPN. A 5-node system is defined and shown in Fig. 2 including
six different nominal modes. Cycles (1 → 2 → 5 → 1, 1 → 2 → 3 → 1,
17
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Figure 2: Graphical models defined to simulate pattern(s) anomaly. Six graphs are defined
and treated as nominal operation modes in complex systems. Pattern failure is simulated
by breaking specific patterns in the model (not shown).
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Algorithm 2 Node inference based on S3 and A3
1: procedure Root-cause analysis
2: Find out the set of failed patterns Λano using S3 or A3.
3: end procedure
4: procedure Node inference
5: A bijective function: f : Λ→ v
6: Xˆ = ∅, Λ¯ano ← Λano
7: while Λ¯ano 6= ∅ do
8: v¯ano ← f(Λ¯ano)
9: ∆ = ∅
10: for vano ∈ v¯ano do
11: Λano = f−1(vano)
12: (Xa, Xb) obtained by Λano
13: v⋆,ano = 1− vano
14: ∆← ∆ ∪ {δ(Xa, Xb) : (F s(v⋆,ano,v \ {vano})− F c0 )/F
c
0} ⊲
Only for S3, F c0 obtained in Algorithm 1
15: ∆← ∆ ∪ {δ(Xa, Xb) : p(vano)} ⊲ Only for A3, p(vano)
obtained from DNN outputs
16: end for
17: S← {S(XA) :
∑
δ(XA, Xa) +
∑
δ(Xa, XA), δ ∈ ∆, Xa ∈ X}
18: Xˆ← Xˆ ∪ {XA : S(XA) = max(S)}
19: Ψ = ∅
20: for Λano ∈ Λ¯ano do
21: {Xa, Xb} obtained by Λano
22: if ∃XˆA ∈ {Xa, Xb}, XˆA ∈ Xˆ then Ψ← Ψ ∪ Λano
23: end if
24: end for
25: Λ¯ano ← Λ¯ano \Ψ
26: end while
27: return Xˆ
28: end procedure
2 → 3 → 2) and loops (4 → 4) are included in the models. The graphi-
cal models are applied to simulate multiple nominal modes. Anomalies are
simulated by breaking specific patterns in the graph; 30 cases are formed in-
cluding 5 cases in one failed pattern, 10 cases in two failed patterns, 10 cases
in three failed patterns, and 5 cases in four failed patterns. Multivariate time
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series data (denoted as dataset1) are generated using VAR process that fol-
lows the causality definition in the graphical models. The VAR process is
widely used in economics and other sciences for its flexibility and simplicity
for generating multivariate time series data [54]. The basic VAR model for
Y (t) = yi,t, i = (1, 2, · · · , f), t ∈ N is defined as
yi,t =
p∑
k=1
n∑
j=1
Aki,jyj,t−k + µt, j = (1, 2, · · · , f) (15)
where p is time lag order, Ai,j is the coefficient of the influence on i-th time
series caused by jth time series, and µt is an error process with the assump-
tion of white noise with zero mean, that is E(µt) = 0, the covariance matrix,
E(µtµ
′
t) = Σµ is time invariant.
STPN parameters: To generate the inputs for RBM and DNN, MEP
is applied to partition the time-series into 9 bins and the length of the short-
time symbol sequence is 1200.
Performance Evaluation: Root-cause identification performances of
S3 and A3 methods are evaluated using dataset1. The accuracy metric
used here is a pattern-by-pattern comparison (both anomalous and nominal)
between the prediction and the ground truth labels. A successful match
occurs if the prediction states that a particular node is not faulty, and if the
ground truth is, in fact, not faulty; the same goes for anomalies. Otherwise,
the prediction is considered an error. Formally, we define the accuracy metric
α1 as:
α1 =
∑n2
j=1
∑m
i=1χ1(Tij = Pij)
mn2
(16)
where Tij denotes the ground truth state (nominal/anomalous) of the j
th
pattern of the ith test sample. Similarly, Pij is the corresponding predicted
state using the root-cause analysis approach. χ1(·) is the indicator function
that returns the value 1 if the expression within the function is true. In
the denominator, m is the number of test samples and n2 is the number
of patterns. With the above metric, results of S3 method and A3 method
are listed in Table 1. Precision and F-measure are also evaluated with the
definitions as follows [55].
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
, Precision =
TP
TP + FP
,
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F-measure =
2
1/Recall+ 1/Precision
,
where TP is the number of true positives (the correctly detected anomalous
patterns), FN is the number of false negatives (the undetected anomalous
patterns), and FP is the number of false positives (the detected anomalous
patterns which are indeed nominal).
Table 1: Root-cause analysis results in S3 method and A3 method with synthetic data.
Method
Training/Testing Accuracy Recall/Precision
samples α1(%) /F-measure (%)
S3 11,400/57,000 97.04 99.40/97.10/98.24
A3 296,400/57,000 98.66 90.46/95.95/93.12
High accuracy is obtained for both S3 and A3 method. While training
time is much less for S3, the inference time in root-cause analysis for S3 is
much more than that of A3, as S3 depends on sequential searching. Note, the
classification formulation in A3 aims to achieve the exact set of anomalous
nodes. On the other hand, the S3 method is an approximate method that
sequentially identifies anomalous patterns and hence, the stopping criteria
would be critical. The observation that the performance of S3 is quite com-
parable to that of A3 suggests a reasonable choice of the stopping criteria.
4.1.2. Anomaly in node(s)
Dataset: Anomaly in node(s) occurs when one node or multiple nodes
fail in the system. For a cyber-physical system, they may be caused by sensor
fault or component degradation. The graphical model defined in Fig. 2 (a)
is applied for generating the nominal data using the VAR process. Anomaly
data are simulated by introducing time delay in a specific node. The time
delay will break most of the causal relationship to and from this node (ex-
cept possibly the self loop, i.e., AP of the failed node). For validation and
comparison, graphs are recovered with VAR process in cases of faulty nodes
as shown in Fig. 3). The figure also shows that there are some variations in
causality between nominal nodes which suggests that causality discovery is
more difficult with the existence of cycles and loops. The generated dataset
is denoted as dataset2. For scalability analysis, a 30-node system is further
defined using VAR process, and the same method is applied to simulate the
anomaly data, noted as dataset3.
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Figure 3: Anomalous conditions with fault node, causality is discovered by VAR model.
Compared with the nominal mode in Fig. 2 (a), the fault node breaks most of the causality
from and to this node. Causality is normalized by the maximal value among all of the
patterns, and causality smaller than 0.03 is not shown.
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Performance Evaluation: This work is aimed at discovering failed
patterns instead of recovering underlying graph (which is very difficult in
graphs with cycles and loops [42, 56]). The discovered anomalous patterns
can then be used for diagnosing the fault node. For instance, a failed pattern
Ni → Nj discovered by root-cause analysis can be caused by the fault node i
or j. However, if multiple failed patterns are related to the node i, then this
node can be deemed anomalous. In this regard, it is important to learn the
impact of one pattern on a detected anomaly compared to another. This can
facilitate a ranking of the failed patterns and enable a robust isolation of an
anomalous node, which is the motivation of the node inference algorithm.
For comparison, we use VAR-based graph recovery method that is widely
applied in economics and other sciences, and efficient in discovering Granger
causality [54]. Note, the test dataset itself is synthetically generated using a
VAR model with a specific time delay. Hence, the causality in such a mul-
tivariate time series is supposed to be well captured by VAR-based method.
The details of the VAR-based root-cause analysis strategy is explained below.
With the given time series, a VAR model (i.e., the coefficients Ai,j in
Eq. 15) can be learned using standard algorithm [54]. The differences in
coefficients between the nominal and anomalous models are subsequently
used to find out the root causes. The pattern is deemed to have failed when
δAi,j > η ·max{δAi,j} where δAi,j = |A
ano
i,j − A
nom
i,j |, η = 0.4.
The results of S3 and VAR using dataset3 are shown in Fig. 4. In panel
(a), all of the changed patterns discovered by A3 and S3 can be attributed to
node 1 (shown by the black boxes in column and row 1). Therefore, node 1
is considered as faulty by the A3 and S3 method. On the other hand, VAR
incorrectly discovers a significant change in the pattern N12 → N2 but not
the patterns originating from N1, and this will be interpreted as failed nodes
N12 and N2, we note this as an error. In general, although A
3, S3 and VAR
can discover the fault node, VAR produces more false alarms. In cases (b)
and (c), A3, S3 find out more correct patterns than VAR, and the discovery
of more changed patterns can contribute to a stronger evidence that node
12 and 25 are faulty, respectively. In general, VAR discovers more patterns
than A3, S3, while quite a lot of them are attributed to false (as shown in
panel (d)), and this causes more false positives in VAR. For A3 and S3, A3
discovers fewer patterns, while most of them are correct, and this means
higher precision in A3. S3 finds out more patterns than A3, indicating higher
recall.
Note that accuracy metrics of recall and precision cannot be directly
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Figure 4: Comparisons of artificial anomaly association (A3), sequential state switching
(S3) method and vector autoregressive (VAR) method using dataset3. The patterns
represented with boxes are from the tail node in x-axis to the head node in y-axis, and the
discovered root causes are marked in black. The boxes in gray are corresponding to the
node with fault injected. The patterns (in black boxes) in the gray zone are the patterns
correctly discovered.
computed in this dataset as the injected fault may not change/flip all of the
patterns connected to the faulty node (gray zone in Fig. 4), depending on
the original graphical model in nominal condition, while the accurate graph
for nominal condition in complex CPSs is difficult to be discovered [42, 56].
In real applications, when more anomalous patterns are discovered incor-
rectly, more effort will be needed to analyze the failed patterns closely and
determine the root-cause node. This will lead to more financial expenditures
and time investment in finding the true root-cause. With this motivation,
an error metric ǫ is defined by computing the ratio of incorrectly discovered
anomalous patterns |{Λǫ}| to all discovered anomalous patterns |{Λano}|, i.e.,
ǫ = |{Λǫ}|/|{Λano}|. The results using dataset2 and dataset3 are listed in
Table 2. Note that the error metric ǫ is defined to address the following key
issue: we do not have the ground truth for the computation of the standard
metrics such as precision and recall. However, if we compare the definition of
error metric and precision, we obtain ǫ = 1−precision if the ground truth is
known. However, for dataset2 and dataset3, we inject the faulty node by
adding time delay. The time delay breaks most causal relationships to and
from this node, but not all of them are broken. In this context, we cannot
compute the precision and recall for the two datasets.
24
Table 2: Comparison of root-cause analysis results with VAR, A3, and S3.
Method
Dataset 2 (5 nodes) Dataset 3 (30 nodes)
|{Λano}| |{Λǫ}| ǫ (%) |{Λano}| |{Λǫ}| ǫ (%)
VAR 20 4 20.0 521 113 21.7
A3 24 2 8.3 105 1 0.95
S3 13 1 7.7 653 0 0
While it should be noted that A3, S3 and VAR can mostly discover the
fault node correctly in both the data sets, the error ratios for A3 and S3
method are much lower than that for VAR (i.e., lower false alarm). As the
scale of the system increases, the number of discovered anomalous patterns
by S3 becomes more than that of by VAR, while the error ratio becomes
significantly less than that of VAR. Therefore, S3 method is both scalable
as well as demonstrates better accuracy. Note that for comparisons between
A3, S3 and VAR, only one nominal mode is considered in Table 2 as VAR
is not directly applicable in cases with multiple nominal modes. A3 and S3
methods can handle multiple nominal modes and it has been validated in
Section 4.1.1.
It should also be noted that the metrics listed in Table 1 are not ap-
plicable in this dataset, as of the anomaly injection approach used in this
work. Introducing time delays at a node level may influence most of the
existing interactions between the node and the other nodes (noted as flipped
pattern in this work). However, the pattern will not be changed or flipped
if the interaction in nominal condition is weak or does not exist. As the ap-
proaches has been validated via dataset1, the results of dataset2 (Table 2)
and dataset3 (Fig. 4, Table 2) intend to show that the proposed approaches
are also capable of node inference via pattern based root-cause analysis.
Remark 1. The root-cause analysis algorithms proposed in this work are fun-
damentally pattern-based as opposed to being node-based. The motivation for
such methods comes from real cyber-physical systems, where cyber-attacks
may only compromise interactions among sub-systems (i.e., relational pat-
terns) without directly affecting sub-systems (i.e., the nodes). In contrast,
the majority of the existing methods mostly focus on node-based anomalies to
the best of our knowledge. For example, in [18], root-cause analysis was per-
formed using Granger Graphical Model with neighborhood similarity (GGM-
N) and Granger Graphical Model with coefficient similarity (GGM-C). Using
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node inference algorithm, the fault nodes can be obtained based on failed pat-
terns, and case studies are illustrated in the next section.
4.2. Root-cause analysis with node inference
Synthetic data sets and a real data set (T...) are applied in this section for
inferring the failed node using the proposed approach as well as performance
comparisons with VAR, GGM-N and GGM-C.
4.2.1. Node based root-cause analysis with synthetic data
With root-cause results in Section 4.1.2, node inference is implemented
using Algorithm 2, the results of dataset3 are listed in Table 3. Note that
node inference for VAR is also implemented using Algorithm 2, with the
weights set as 1 for each failed pattern. The performance in terms of recall,
precision and F-measure of A3 and S3 are compared with VAR, GGM-N,
and GGM-C (algorithms of GGM-N and GGM-C are in [18], parameters are
as follows, λ = 30, 45; λ1 = 10, 10; λ2 = 10, 10 for GGM-N and GGM-C,
respectively).
Table 3: Node inference results in VAR, GGM-N, GGM-C, A3 and S3 methods with
synthetic data.
Approach Recall (%) Precision (%) F-measure (%)
VAR 100 50.8 67.4
GGM-N 83.3 100 90.9
GGM-C 80.0 96.0 87.3
A3 96.7 90.6 93.6
S3 100 100 100
4.2.2. Node inference with real dataset – Tennessee Eastman process (TEP)
TEP data is based on a realistic simulation program of a chemical plant
from the Eastman Chemical Company, USA, and it has been widely used
for process monitoring community as a source of data for comparing various
approaches, and a benchmark for control and monitoring studies [53, 57, 58].
The process consists of five major units: reactor, condenser, compressor,
separator, and stripper, with 53 variables simulated including 41 measured
and 12 manipulated (the agitation speed is not included in TEP dataset as
it is not manipulated). 21 faults are simulated in TEP program, while 8 of
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Table 4: Methods for node inference with TEP dataset.
Method Description
PCA-CONT PCA, total contribution based
PCA-RES PCA, residual based
DPCA-CONT DPCA projection, total contribution based
DPCA-RES DPCA projection, residual based
CVA-CONT CVA, total contribution based
CVA-RES CVA projection, residual based
GGM-N GGM with neighborhood similarity
GGM-C GGM with coefficient similarity
A3 Artificial anomaly association
S3 Sequential state switching
PCA–Principal Component Analysis, DPCA–Dynamic PCA,
CVA–Canonical Variate Analysis, GGM–Granger graphical
model.
them are applied in this work, as the root causes of these faults are intuitively
explained in [53].
For comparison, the methods in the state-of-the-art are used as listed in
Table 4. The root-cause results are shown in Table 5, which are essentially
root cause potential rankings of the variable (most closely related to the
anomaly), so the lower number indicates better performance.
According to [18, 53], faults 4, 5, and 11 are the most difficult ones to
be detected. However, the rankings obtained in [53] show that faults 21, 5,
12 and 6 present low accuracy in finding out the root cause of the faults. In
fault 21, all of the existing approaches cannot find out the root cause until
the last several variables, which means diagnosing this fault needs to check
a large number of variables, which will significantly increase the cost.
It should be noted that, [53] lists the variables assumed to be most closely
related to the faults, while it can be clearly observed from the raw data that
the variables with significant deviations from the nominal condition are more
than one in each fault. Thus it is difficult to label all the failed variables due
to the lack of domain knowledge. Therefore, metrics used in Table 3 cannot
be applied in this case. Instead, we compare the cost of identifying the root
cause. We define diagnosis cost Dc to evaluate the efforts to the root cause,
according to the rankings in Table 5. For example, if the ranking of the root
cause by method A is 10, we have to check the first 10 variables ranked by
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Table 5: The rankings of node inference results on TEP dataset
Fault GGMb PCAa DPCAa CVAa
A3 S3
-N -C -CONT -RES -CONT -RES -CONT -RES
2
0-15h - - 2 4 2 5 10 2 30 5
15-40h - - 2 5 3 12 10 4 31 9
4
0-15h 2 2 1 1 1 1 10 1 1 1
15-40h 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 2 1
5
0-15h 2 2 12 21 11 8 15 17 21 2
15-40h 4 4 9 35 14 30 16 16 18 2
6
0-15h - - 1 6 3 2 6 6 8 2
15-40h - - 7 51 11 45 1 3 2 21
11
0-15h 2 2 1 1 1 1 10 1 1 1
15-40h 2 2 1 1 1 1 13 1 1 1
12
0-15h - - 1 6 1 3 10 14 4 1
15-40h - - 10 21 4 36 17 26 3 1
14
0-15h - - 2 2 1 2 11 1 4 1
15-40h - - 2 2 1 2 11 1 13 1
21
0-15h - - 52 40 48 48 52 52 4 1
15-40h - - 52 48 52 52 52 50 3 1
a The results of PCA, DPCA, and CVA are from [53], where 0-5h
results are used (as shown in [53]. As time progresses, the accuracy
decreases; the best results are listed here. These are rankings of the
potential root-cause variables which are most closely related to the
anomaly. The lower the number, the better the performance.
b The results of GGM-N and GGM-C are from [18].
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method A to ascertain the root cause, and we can note the diagnosis cost
is 10. By multiplying the number of measurements in each fault (treated as
the number of times to implement root-cause analysis), the diagnosis cost for
each fault is obtained and shown in Fig. 5.
Fault
2 4 5 6 11 12 14 21
Co
st
103
104
PCA-CONT
PCA-RES
DPCA-CONT
DPCA-RES
CVA-CONT
CVA-RES
GGM-N
GGM-C
S3
A3
(a) 0-15h
Fault
2 4 5 6 11 12 14 21
Co
st
103
104
PCA-CONT
PCA-RES
DPCA-CONT
DPCA-RES
CVA-CONT
CVA-RES
GGM-N
GGM-C
S3
A3
(b) 15-40h
Figure 5: Diagnosis cost of each fault using methods listed in Table 4. Each fault are
considered independently, with diagnosis cost represented by different types of markers
(plotted in log scale). The dash-dot lines are used to connect the same method in different
faults.
Fig. 5 shows that the proposed approach obtains better root-cause analy-
sis results in most of the faults, compared with the other methods. GGM-N
and GGM-C in [18] only list the results of faults 4, 5, and 11 in the two time
spans (6 cases in total), and S3 and A3 outperform 4 and 3 cases respectively.
Compared with the other methods (PCA, DPCA, and CVA) in 8 faults, S3
achieves the best performance in 6 faults whereas A3 does not obtain the best
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results although it can still find out the fault variable at a reasonable cost.
The diagnosis cost of the proposed approaches fluctuates less over multiple
considered cases compared to other methods, meaning that our approach
is robust under different scenarios. This observation is also reflected where
other methods perform well in some cases, but not for some others (e.g., fault
21 in panels (a) and (b)).
4.3. Discussions
The proposed approaches (S3 and A3) in the previous sections are pattern-
based root-cause methods, as opposed to node-based. With this setup, the
approaches can be applied to handle both pattern and node failures. The
proposed approaches present advantages in:
1. Ability to handle multiple nominal modes: The STPN+RBM framework
is capable of learning multiple modes and treated as nominal, which cor-
responds to diverse operation modes in complex CPSs. The proposed
root-cause analysis approaches inherit this benefit and are validated with
dataset1.
2. Accuracy: The proposed approaches–S3 and A3–demonstrate high accu-
racy in root-causes analysis with synthetic data and real data. More-
over, the approach shows considerable credibility in recall, precision and
F-measure in both pattern-based and node-based root-cause analysis.
3. Scalability: The proposed approaches–S3 and A3–are scalable with the
size of the system, and this is validated in TEP dataset. The scalability
is important in complex CPSs where a large number of sub-systems are
usually involved.
4. Robustness: Compared with the state-of-the-art methods, the proposed
approaches can more effectively isolate the fault node in both synthetic
data and real data.
5. Adaptivity: The proposed tool-chain is adaptive in different fault scenar-
ios including pattern-based faults, node-based faults, and various fault
mechanisms.
6. Efficiency: The proposed framework is efficient in terms of diagnosis cost
to ascertain the root cause for decision making and other applications.
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Note that, the root-cause analysis is only conducted when there is an
anomaly detected. However, for real-life complex system monitoring, it is
almost impossible to avoid false alarms completely. An experiment is car-
ried out here where we perform root-cause analysis on 1900 nominal test
cases (with 25 patterns in each case) based on the synthetic dataset 1 (Fig.
3). We find that S3 and A3 algorithms detect most of the patterns to be
completely nominal (93.35% and 98.70% respectively). Therefore, even with
falsely detected anomalies, the system operator will only have to inspect a
relatively smaller percentage of the patterns (6.65% in the case of S3 and
1.30% in the case of A3 for the false alarms). While we aim to reduce the
false alarm rate of anomaly detection, we emphasize more on reducing the
missed detection (an anomaly is not flagged when in reality it is present,
i.e., false negative) rate. S3 is designed with the intention of avoiding false
negatives by determining the maximal inferrable subset. This increases the
chance of avoiding critical safety issues and cascading system failures.
It should be mentioned that the node inference algorithm is intended to
include every node until all of the detected failed patterns can be interpreted.
A threshold needs to be established to avoid detecting too many nodes as
faulty based on the anomaly score. Also, optimal reasoning strategy in node
failure inference including single node and multiple nodes will be included in
future work.
Remark 2. S3 runs in a greedy manner, although the validation results show
that this algorithm performs reasonably well. However, S3 may erroneously
say one root-cause is more important than the other in cases where multiple
root-causes are equally important. This has the consequence where the user
may succumb to prioritize falsely during decision-making. While S3 seems
to be more comprehensive and have a better performance in most cases, A3
is comparatively more time-efficient and will potentially have superior capa-
bility in handling cases with multiple root-causes of equal importance. The
average time required for S3 and A3 to analyze one data point in dataset
3 using a single core CPU is 21.3 seconds and 0.4 seconds respectively. To
speed up computation, it is possible to install dedicated hardware (e.g. field
programmable gated arrays, or FPGAs) for parallel processing in actual im-
plementation.
Computational complexity. Let T denote the number of the data points.
With a fixed STPN structure (fixed number of symbols and fixed depth for D-
Markov and xD-Markov machines), the computational cost is O(f 2T ) (based
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on Eq. 4, we use Stirling’s approximation for the factorial computations, the
complexity of each input is O(T ), and there are f 2 patterns in the STPN
model [34]). For the S3 with the trained STPN+RBM model, the overall
computational complexity is O(f 2T+f 4nh), where nh is the number of hidden
units for RBM (the computational complexity of RBM inference for each
input is O(f 2+ f 2× nh) based on Eq. 11, and the sequential searching takes
f 2 times to get the subset of failed patterns in the worst case). For the A3
with the trained STPN+DNN model, the overall computational complexity
is O(f 2T + P), where P is the number of connections in the DNN model,
P = f 2 × nh1 +
∑p−1
hi=1
nhi × nhi+1, p is the number of layers.
If we also consider another perspective, the combination of the two ap-
proaches will provide us the privilege to optimize both the training process
and inference process. Workflow can be developed by applying S3 for downs-
electing the potential failed patterns, generating a subset of training data for
A3, and then implementing inference with A3. Further analysis is being car-
ried out for integrating the two approaches.
5. Conclusions
For root-cause analysis in distributed complex cyber-physical systems
(CPSs), this work proposed an inference based metric defined on ‘short’ time
series sequences to distinguish anomalous STPN patterns. The associated an-
alytical result formulated the root-cause analysis problem as a minimization
problem through the inference based metric, and presented two new approx-
imate algorithms–the sequential state switching (S3) and artificial anomaly
association (A3)–for the root-cause analysis problem. Note that the ratio-
nale for qualifying the underlying system as ‘distributed’ is that we consider
that the system is composed of many sub-systems that have their own local
controllers to satisfy local objectives while aiming to achieve a system-wide
performance goal via physical interactions and information exchange. There-
fore, it is important to capture the individual sub-system characteristics (us-
ing atomic patterns) and their relationships (using relational patterns). The
proposed approaches are validated and showed high accuracy in finding failed
patterns and diagnosing the anomalous node in addition to being capable
of handling multiple nominal modes in operation. We also demonstrated
the scalability, robustness, adaptiveness, and efficiency of the proposed ap-
proaches with comparisons to state-of-the-art methods using synthetic data
sets and real data sets under a large number of different fault scenarios.
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Future work will pursue: (i) optimal reasoning strategy in node failure
inference including single node and multiple nodes, (ii) integration of the
sequential state switching (S3) and artificial anomaly association (A3) to
improve the performance in terms of accuracy and computational efficiency,
and (iii) detection and root-cause analysis of simultaneous multiple faults in
complex CPSs.
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7. SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
7.1. Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1. Let Assumption 3 hold and N˜ab1 = t1N˜
ab
11 such that (t1−1)k >
1.
Proof. As N˜ab1 = N˜
ab
11+N˜
ab
12 and N˜
ab
11 , N˜
ab
12 are within similar orders, we have
t1 − 1 > ζ, where ζ > 0. From Assumption 2, we have k ≫ 1. Thus, there
exists a sufficiently large k to satisfy (t1 − 1)k > 1. 
7.2. Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1. Let Assumptions 1-3 hold. The variation of the metrics
in the anomalous condition δ
(
ln(Λab)
)
> 0, when ηa ≥ 1.
Proof. Based on the Eq. 5, we have,
δ
(
ln(Λab)
)
= ln
(
Λabnom
)
− ln
(
Λabano
)
=
|Qa|∑
m=1
(
ln((N˜abm )!)− ln((N˜
ab
m − sgn(qm)η
a)!)
− ln((N˜abm +N
ab
m + |Σ
b| − 1)!)
+ ln((N˜abm − sgn(qm)η
a +Nabm + |Σ
b| − 1)!)
+ ln((N˜abm1 +N
ab
m1)!)
− ln((N˜abm1 − sgn(qm)η
a +Nabm1)!)
− ln((N˜abm1)!) + ln((N˜
ab
m1 − sgn(qm)η
a)!)
)
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where |Σb| = 2 in this two-state case.
For f = ln(n!), according to the derivative property of Gamma function
[59], we have,
df
dn
=
1
n!
d(n!)
dn
= −γ +
n∑
p=1
1
p
,
where γ is the Euler-Mascheroni constant.
dδ
(
ln(Λab)
)
dηa
=
2∑
m=1
sgn(qm)
(
tmN˜
ab
m1−sgn(qm)η
a∑
p=1
1
p
−
tm(1+k)N˜abm1+1−sgn(qm)η
a∑
p=1
1
p
+
(1+k)N˜abm1−sgn(qm)η
a∑
p=1
1
p
−
N˜abm1−sgn(qm)η
a∑
p=1
1
p
)
For Harmonic series,
∑n
p=1
1
p
≈ lnn+γ, where γ is the Euler-Mascheroni
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constant.
dδ
(
ln(Λab)
)
dηa
≈
2∑
m=1
sgn(qm)
(
ln
(
tmN˜
ab
m1 − sgn(qm)η
a
)
− ln
(
tm(1 + k)N˜
ab
m1 + 1− sgn(qm)η
a
)
+ ln
(
(1 + k)N˜abm1 − sgn(qm)η
a
)
− ln
(
N˜abm1 − sgn(qm)η
a
))
= ln
t1N˜
ab
11 − η
a
t1(1 + k)N˜ab11 + 1− η
a
(1 + k)N˜ab11 − η
a
N˜ab11 − η
a
+ ln
t2(1 + k)N˜
ab
21 + 1 + η
a
t2N˜ab21 + η
a
N˜ab21 + η
a
(1 + k)N˜ab21 + η
a
= ln
A1 − N˜
ab
11η
a(1 + t1 + k)
A1 − N˜ab11η
a(1 + t1 + t1k −
1
ηa
+ 1
N˜ab
11
)
+ ln
A2 + N˜
ab
21η
a(1 + t2 + t2k +
1
ηa
)
A2 + N˜ab21η
a(1 + t2 + k)
where Am = tm(1 + k)
(
N˜abm1
)2
+
(
ηa
)2
> 0, m = 1, 2.
According to Lemma 1, we have (t1 − 1)k > 1, For η
a ≥ 1, (t1 − 1)k −
1
ηa
+ 1
N˜ab
11
> 0, i.e., k < t1k −
1
ηa
+ 1
N˜ab
11
. Thus,
ln
A1 − N˜
ab
11η
a(1 + t1 + k)
A1 − N˜ab11η
a(1 + t1 + t1k −
1
ηa
+ 1
N˜ab
11
)
> 0
From the definition of t2 in Section 3.1, t2 > 1, t2k +
1
ηa
> k, thus,
ln
A2 + N˜
ab
21η
a(1 + t2 + t2k +
1
ηa
)
A2 + N˜ab21η
a(1 + t2 + k)
> 0
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Therefore, we have
dδ
(
ln(Λab)
)
dηa
> 0
From Eq. 5, if ηa = 0, δ
(
ln(Λab)
)
= 0.
Thus we have δ
(
ln(Λab)
)
> 0, when ηa ≥ 1. 
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